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Abstract
Communication is faster than ever. Innovations in low cost network computing
have brought an era in which people can effortlessly and instantaneously view and post
opinions collaboratively with others across the world. With such an infrastructure of
public message boards, chat rooms and instant messaging systems, there is also a large
potential for abuse by people wishing to capitalize on such open services by posting
unsolicited advertisements.
An entire industry has been constructed around the prevention of unsolicited
electronic advertisements (SPAM). This thesis examines various techniques for
preventing SPAM, focusing on Completely Automated Public Turing Tests to Tell
Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA), a challenge/response technique where an
image is displayed with text that is heavily distorted. It also examines the feasibility of
breaking CAPTCHA programmatically, alternatives to CAPTCHA based on filtering,
improvements to CAPTCHA using photo recognition and avoiding the need for
CAPTCHA using naïve approaches.
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Chapter I – Introduction
People who frequently use the Internet for communication, social networking and
purchases often come across web pages that request that they type the value of an image
with distorted text into an input box. The purpose of such requests is to prove that the
requester is in fact human and not an automated computer program. This challenge
response test is what is known as a Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell
Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA). The term was originally coined by several
developers at Carnegie Mellon University, and the school’s Computer Science
Department currently holds the trademark on the acronym [1].
There is a directed effort by commercial interests to break CAPTCHAs, that is to
create computer programs to solve the puzzles in order to post unsolicited messages and
advertisements. Many such attempts are similar to the nature of attempting to get
messages past filters for unsolicited e-mail (also known as SPAM). There are also
noncommercial interests in breaking CAPTCHA, either to improve the CAPTCHA itself,
force developers to find alternatives by showing CAPTCHA is broken, or general
curiosity in bettering the field of Computer Science.

1.1 Problem Statement
My research focuses on three major problems:
1. Is it possible to break common distorted text based CAPTCHA, i.e.
recognize and answer challenges programmatically, using currently
1

available open source tools for filtering and character recognition?
2. How can CAPTCHA be improved? Are there other challenges that can be
created that are easier for humans to answer and more challenging for
computers to respond to programmatically?
3. How effective is CAPTCHA against combating SPAM compared to other
prevention techniques?

1.2 Explanation of the Problems
Unsolicited bulk e-mail, advertisements posted to public forms, blogs and bulletin
boards and other forms of SPAM are a major problem on the Internet for several reasons.
The cost of sending unsolicited advertisements is relatively cheap but consumes large
amounts of bandwidth causing cost to be shifted to regular consumers. A majority of
SPAM is also fraud and can cause uninformed end-users to lose a considerable amount of
money [2]. Because of these facts, multimillion dollar industries arose simply to identify
and combat SPAM, which increases costs to service providers, the cost of entry for
legitimate businesses and overall costs for end users.
Public forums, bulletin boards and blogs are particularly susceptible to SPAM
posting because they are designed to facilitate a high degree of open interaction and
discussion with either no verification or simple registration. CAPTCHA becomes
important for these services to prevent automated scripts from flooding public discussion
areas. Such postings can make legitimate websites completely unusable. However,
CAPTCHA does make it more difficult for visually impaired users to participate in such
2

discussions. My research into attempting to break CAPTCHA is intended to answer the
question: is CAPTCHA still a viable form of protection against SPAM?
Regardless of the solution to the first problem, my research also examines
alternatives to the traditional distorted text based CAPTCHA and attempts to improve on
such techniques and provide innovative approaches. To these ends, I have developed an
application that can be integrated into existing websites and that provides a new form of
photograph based CAPTCHA utilizing a vast library of user contributed photographs and
metadata on those photographs to generate challenges.
CAPTCHA challenges can potentially prevent SPAM but have a considerable
number of drawbacks, primarily the inability for the visually impaired to answer most
challenges. Many websites and content management systems have attempted to use
traditional SPAM filtering techniques such as those used to prevent unsolicited e-mail.
The final problem my research addresses is the effectiveness of non-CAPTCHA
techniques for preventing SPAM versus CAPTCHA challenges.

1.3 Understanding CAPTCHA
The goals of CAPTCHA are to eliminate automated robots and scripts from using
a website as a means of spreading unsolicited advertisements, inflating rankings in search
engines and distributing viruses. Although an individual could still accomplish these
tasks, using an automated program makes the distribution of SPAM much faster, causes
the damage to be more widespread and makes the results considerably more difficult to
clean up.
3

At one time a simple image with slightly distorted text may have been enough to
confuse most web robots and allow web designers to validate human users; however, the
presence of such text has led programmers to create even more sophisticated robots
capable of using Optical Character Recognition (OCR) algorithms —the same types of
algorithms used by scanner software to convert scanned documents into text— to
recognize the text within the images.
Such innovations have led to more complicated CAPTCHA, which involves
multi-colored distorted text on altered backgrounds that contain added lines, noise and
possible faded and rotated characters that are not part of the CAPTCHA itself [Figure 1]
[3].

Figure 1 - Example of a CAPTCHA

One of the foundations of security in the field of Computer Science is the ability
to create a process or algorithm that is very easy to do computationally but is very
difficult to undo. This foundation is used in asymmetric or public/private key encryption,
which utilizes keys based on the products of two large prime numbers: something that is
very easy to do but difficult to undo due to the complexity of factoring products of prime
numbers. This same concept applies to the idea of CAPTCHA, although in a slightly
4

different context.
With CAPTCHA, a computer program must test the users to see if they are
human. By doing so, the program needs to generate a test, to which it knows the answer,
but which cannot be solved programmatically. There is an odd paradox here where the
program generates a test and grades it for correctness; a test that the program itself cannot
pass [4].
CAPTCHA is considered an example of a Reverse Turing Test. In a traditional
Turing Test, software developers attempt to generate a program that can simulate written
human communication. Typically a user will attempt to communicate with the Turing
Machine over a text message system to determine if he or she is talking to a real person
or a computer on the remote end. Although there is much debate about whether it is
theoretically possible to create a true Turing Test or Reverse Turing Test [5], the concept
itself does lend itself to many limitations, technical problems and ethical boundaries
when dealing with real people.
Simply put, CAPTCHA works because, even with the advancement and
innovations in computing technology over the past several decades, there are still tasks
that can be accomplished faster and more easily by humans than they can by computers;
specifically simple puzzles that involve images, natural language processing or a
combination of the two.
Current advancements in image recognition, shape recognition, artificial
intelligence and machine learning may tip that scale back in favor of computer algorithms
in solving CAPTCHA challenges. Therefore, programmers and security experts must be
5

diligent in finding new techniques to correctly identify humans, prevent SPAM and
maintain security in website models.

1.4 Types of CAPTCHA
The most prevalent form of CAPTCHA is an image with distorted text, although
there are many others. A CAPTCHA needs to be able to automatically determine if the
end user is human or a program. Therefore, any test that is easy for a human to solve yet
difficult to write an automated program for can be considered a CAPTCHA. Recent
advancements have led to CAPTCHAs based on pictures, word puzzles, spoken audio
and other challenges, each with their own strengths and weaknesses.

1.4.1 Word Puzzles
One such technique is implemented as a plugin for the commercial bulletin board
software, vBulletin. "NoSpam! - an alternative to CAPTCHA images" is a plugin
designed by a programmer who goes by the handle Antialiasis [6]. The plugin allows a
board administrator to define a set of questions and answers. The questions can be simple
(e.g. "What is 2 + 2?") or technical questions related to the forum. The author also
suggests embedding an image and asking the question about the image itself.
The advantages to such an approach include accessibility to the visually impaired
as well as providing a less cumbersome mechanism of distorted text which sometimes
takes users several tries to decipher correctly. For this technique to be effective, there
needs to be a considerably large number of questions so that a programmer simply does
not farm the website for all the possible challenge responses. The questions also need to
6

be simple enough to be quickly and easily answered. A similar tool for Wordpress, WPGatekeeper, offers challenge questions such as "How do you spell the color blue?" [7]
However, questions such as these could eventually be circumvented by a sophisticated
natural language processor.

1.4.2 Sound Based
Some CAPTCHAs provide a sound file alternative for uses that are visually
impaired. This allows the user to listen to an audio clip, typically one that is heavily
distorted, as a means to identify the text in a visual CAPTCHA. Although a sound only
alternative is a possibility, such an implementation would be inaccessible to those who
have hearing impairments, users who are at computers without sound cards such as those
in libraries or users who are in noisy environments such as coffee shops or public
wireless locations.
Sound CAPTCHAs also run into the same limitations as picture based
CAPTCHAs as they require large numbers of voice recordings to be effective. One
solution is automatically generated sounds using voice-synthesizing software; however,
such sound based challenges could be circumvented using voice recognition software.
Many audio challenges also add in background noise and various other voices chattering.
Although this addition makes it more difficult for voice recognition programs to extract
the correct response, it can also make it difficult for humans to understand what the
correct response should be.
The current official version of CAPTCHA created by the term’s trademark holder,
Carnegie Mellon University, named reCAPTCHA, has support for an auditory
7

CAPTCHA for users who are visually impaired. In addition, reCAPTCHA is more useful
than just a SPAM prevention mechanism. It actually helps facilitate digitizing books into
an electronic form [Figure 2].

Figure 2 - reCAPTCHA Example

It works by providing two words, one which is known and the other taken from a
book digitalization project that an optical character recognition (OCR) program could not
correctly identify with confidence. If the CAPTCHA is validated correctly with the
known word, the user submitted value of the unknown word is stored. The same
unknown word is presented to multiple people to gain a total confidence score on what
the word actually is [8].

1.4.3 Photograph Identification
One means of determining if an individual is human is by using a matrix of
photographs. A challenge is presented where the user is asked to select a set of photos
which have something in common with one another. An example is the KittenAuth
8

project by Oli Warner. Using KittenAuth, a user is presented with a series of nine images
[Figure 3]. The user must pick out the three which are kittens in order to prove he or she
is human [9].
The advantage to such a challenge is that for people who are visually impaired, it
may be easier to recognize photographs than it is to read distorted text challenges. The
disadvantage is that a massive repository of both kitten and non-kitten related photos
would be necessary for such a system to be practical against SPAM prevention. If the
program contained only a few hundred photos, given enough time, an attacker could
manually identify many of the kittens and then proceeded to using image comparison
techniques to break the challenge and send automated requests.

Figure 3 - KittenAuth Photo-Based CAPTCHA

Part of my research deals with this specific type of CAPTCHA challenge and
improves it to be more robust and less vulnerable to attack by utilizing a larger public
repository of images. The result is an application called FlickMeCaptcha, which interacts
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with the popular photo sharing website Flickr and is covered in more detail in Chapters 3
and 4.

1.5 Alternatives to CAPTCHA
1.5.1 Bayesian Networks
There are solutions that simply test the contents of the message body itself rather
than add an additional CAPTCHA test, similar to how e-mail SPAM filters work. Early
spam filters for e-mail used developer defined rules such as searching e-mail for specific
types of websites or words and phrases. As spammers became adept at circumventing sets
of known rules and the rules themselves grew to enormous sizes, more dynamic
approaches based on machine learning came into play.
Modern SPAM filters are based on the concept of a naïve Bayes classifier, also
known as a Bayesian Network. In 1998, Sahami and others trained the first of such filters
with promising results [10]. Today, the same Bayesian filtering has been incorporated
into many end user applications and SPAM filters such as Mozilla Thunderbird and the
free project SpamAssassin [11].
Bayesian Networks work off a probabilistic graph model. Under the surface they
are standard acyclic directed graphs that can be trained for classification using machine
learning techniques. Given a certain threshold they can be trained to return, within the
tolerance of a given percentage, items that are likely to be SPAM.
Bayesian Networks are not the perfect solution to preventing SPAM since they
still have several problems when used with websites. E-mail based filters have the
10

advantage of also being able to perform checks based on e-mail headers, reverse domain
name service (DNS) lookups and other techniques in addition to the Bayesian analysis to
derive a total confidence score. On a website where user input is available, many of these
options are not available and the filter must determine the legitimacy of the posted item
based solely on the text entered.
Another common problem is Bayesian Filtering Poisoning. Using this technique,
a spammer incorporates several legitimate words together with the SPAM so the filter
either lets the message through or incorrectly marks legitimate e-mails as SPAM leading
to false positives within the SPAM filter. One particularly tricky example involves using
text that is the same color as the background [Figure 4].

Figure 4 - Seemingly Legitimate Text

Figure 5 - Hidden SPAM

Using changes in text and background color, an e-mail that seems like an
unsolicited advertisement to the user may pass through a SPAM filter. Highlighting the
text reveals the characters that are used to run the words together [Figure 5] [12].
11

Utilizing a Bayesian Network based filter on user submitted input could be used
as an alternative to CAPTCHA. The advantages include not bothering the user with the
CAPTCHA puzzle and not taking into consideration users who may be visually impaired
and unable to read the challenge. However, there is the possibly that the filter could
identify false positives and incorrectly label legitimate content as SPAM.
In my research I examined several non-CAPTCHA based alternatives that
examine the contents of messages to determine if they are SPAM. Such alternatives
include Akismet [13], Mollom [14] and Defensio [15]. These alternatives are
implemented as web based services that can be accessed through a publicly available
interface. All of them are free for non-commercial use with optional licenses for
businesses and large websites. Each also has plugins for popular content management
systems such as Wordpress, Drupal and Movable Type. They most likely implement a
series of techniques such as Bayesian Networks and blacklists although their exact
techniques are kept secret to prevent attackers from being able to circumvent the systems.

1.5.2 The Naïve Approach
There is a less sophisticated approach to preventing SPAM based on the
assumption that automated scripts written to post SPAM are not designed to be very
intelligent. In other words, the programmers that create SPAM posting scripts design
them to post as many websites as possible without paying much attention to any other
content on the page. An example of a naïve approach is placing an input field on a
website and then changing its display property in the style sheet to make it invisible. A
simple automated program would most likely not be designed to download and parse the
12

style sheet and would fill out the form field that could not be seen in a real web browser,
clearly indicating the post is SPAM.
In my research I examine naïve approaches used on websites. Naïve techniques
do not provide a high degree of SPAM prevention and can easily be circumvented,
however the cost and effort for identifying and circumventing these implementations is
often not economical for posting SPAM to small websites.

1.6 Ethical Concerns in Using and Breaking CAPTCHA
Although added visual distortions may make it more difficult for a program to
efficiently identify the characters, these distortions pose a second challenge of also
making it more difficult for humans to identify the characters as well, especially since
one in twelve people in the United States have some form of color blindness [16]. Being
color deficient in one or more major color group can make it difficult if not impossible to
identify characters in CAPTCHA.
There are many ethical dilemmas found both in using CAPTCHA and in trying to
circumvent or break CAPTCHA. Issues of legality, security and access for those with
visual impairments are just a few of the many issues surrounding both CAPTCHA and
various other SPAM prevention technologies. Some companies have issued cease and
desist orders against developers and companies who create software to circumvent
CAPTCHA while others have taken software developers to court. The issues that arise
begin to congeal over the very idea of creating illegal software. The simple act of
developing software brings up questions of liability when it comes to damages, whether
13

real or virtual, when faced with the concept types of software that are defined as illegal to
develop.
One of the more recent and predominant cases involving software that
circumvents CAPTCHA is in the case of TicketMaster vs. RMG. TicketMaster found that
certain ticket brokers were purchasing large numbers of tickets in very small amounts of
time. Some of these brokers used a service from RMG called ticketbrokertools.com
which was available only to RMG clients. Through cooperation with brokers,
TicketMaster found that RMG's PurchaseMaster software actually made a slew of
automated requests to TicketMaster's website. RMG had developed software to break the
CAPTCHA used by TicketMaster and funneled the request through their client's PCs to
make the request look like they were coming from several sources [17].
Another questionable ethical practice involves employing people to solve massive
amounts of CAPTCHA problems in a farming type situation. Technically a real human
would be solving the problems; however, it would be for the purposes of posting SPAM
or launching some type of attack. There are widespread, although unsubstantiated, reports
of such farming [18], however the feasibility of such a concept comes into serious
question. Jeff Atwood of the website Coding Horror puts the feasibility of such an
operation into perspective in the follow blog article:

“Let's say spammers set up a sweatshop to employ people to look at
computer screens and answer CAPTCHA challenges. They get to send one
message for each challenge passed. Assuming 10 seconds per challenge,
14

and paying roughly $5 per hour, that represents $14 per thousand
messages [sic]. A typical spam run of 1 million messages per day would
cost $14,000 per day and require 116 people working 24/7.
This would break the economic model used by most current spammers. A
recent Wired article showed one spammer earning $10 for each successful
sale. At that rate, the cost of $14,000 for 1,000,000 spam emails requires a
1 in 1000 success rate just to break even, whereas current spammers are
managing a 1 in 100,000 or even 1 in 1,000,000 success rate [19].”

A more viable model would be to get real people to solve CAPTCHA challenges
either for free or in exchange for something with insignificant cost. According to
Computer World Magazine, such a technique was implemented by one group using a
virtual stripper [20]. The animated image of the stripper would gradually remove clothing
as users enter in solutions to CAPTCHAs. Each CATPCHA was actually taken from
Yahoo’s e-mail service and the solutions were used to generate a collection of accounts to
use for spamming purposes.
There are many ethical considerations surrounding CAPTCHA. As far as their
use, the primary concern is accessibility for those who are impaired. Improvement in the
use of audio and word puzzle substitutes has greatly reduced this concert in newer
implementations.
As far as solving CAPTCHA programmatically, issues have been raised as to the
legality of breaking CAPTCHA for the purpose of sales. The Ticketmaster vs RMG
15

shows that the courts hold that development of software specifically for the purpose of
violating TicketMaster’s terms of service is illegal, however, this raises further concerns
about the ethics of creating software to break CAPTCHA for research purposes, in an
effort to find either better CAPTCHA or to enhance the field of artificial intelligence as a
whole.
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review
Applications designed to programmatically break CAPTCHA do not need to have
a high degree of accuracy. Even if a program can only get ten percent of the image
challenges correct, it could access and submit to a page several hundred times a minute
negating the inaccuracy. Typically the more SPAM prone websites will also add monitors
that can detect several connection attempts by a single client in a short interval and will
ban such connections. In this sense software that prevents Denial of Service attacks has
the side-effect of also helping deflect CAPTCHA breaking attacks. This forces spammers
to find ways of getting other clients to make such attempts, either by means of spreading
viruses, using unsecured open proxy servers or coaxing individuals with offers of free
services or money.
There has been considerable research put forth into creating algorithms that can
identify and successfully answer CAPTCHA challenges. There are several challenges
facing image analysis. Each of the papers I examined dealt with issues of segmentation,
that is separating individual letters in a CAPTCHA challenge, and shape recognition, that
is identifying individual characters or glyphs.
Before beginning my own experiments and writing my own applications, I studied
existing academic research as well as individual blogs and user experience. I read the
works of Chellapilla and Simard who authored the paper Using Machine Learning to
Break Visual Human Interaction Proofs [21], Mori and Malik who wrote Breaking a
Visual CAPTCHA [22], Hocevar who created a program called PWNtcha [24] that
attempted to circumvent several common forms of CAPTCHA, and Jeff Atwood of the
17

blog Coding Horror [19] who comments on the state of CAPTCHA breaking as well as
using a naïve approach to prevent SPAM.

2.1 Chellapill and Simard
In the paper Using Machine Learning to Break Visual Human Interaction Proofs,
Chellapilla and Simard [21], two software engineers from Microsoft, examine breaking
hard CAPTCHA using a combination of recognition, machine learning algorithms and
segmentation techniques. During the course of their research, they determine that most
simple CAPTCHAs, which they referred to as Human Interaction Proofs or HIPs, were
simple recognition problems while the harder ones required significantly more complex
segmentation algorithms.
For simple CAPTCHAs such as Milblocks, Chellapilla and Simard were able to
achieve an end-to-end segmentation success rate of 88.8% with a 95.9% recognition for
those correctly segmented. Similarly, the Register CAPTCHA had a 95.4% segmentation
success rate with an 87.1% recognition rate of successful segmentation. Harder
CAPTCHAs to segment, such as Ticketmaster's, which uses diagonal intersecting lines,
yielded a segmentation success rate of only 16.6%. Of those correctly segmented, the
recognition rate was 82.3%. Their conclusions showed that once segmentation can be
broken, the reaming recognition problem can be solved easily with a machine learning
algorithm.
Chellapilla and Simard pose the question: What makes segmenting characters in
CAPTCHA difficult? Their analysis shows that segmentation is very computationally
18

expensive requiring examination of many different patterns to locate candidates. The
segmentation functions are also very complex because they must identify patterns over
the set of all possible valid and invalid patterns, which is substantially more difficult than
traditional classification problems. Finally, identifying symbols over a set of valid and
invalid candidates is a combinational problem, which can very quickly explode into a
high order problem size. For example correctly identifying 10 characters among 20
candidates has a 1 in 184,756 (20 choose 10) chance in succeeding by random guessing
[21].
Unlike Chellapilla and Simard, in my own research I do not attempt to use a
machine learning algorithm to analyze CAPTCHA challenges. Instead I use freely
available optical character recognition (OCR) software combined with image filtering
over a large set of challenges. The software I have developed is modularized to
accommodate a variety of different filtering techniques. Using an object orientated
approach, the analysis tool can be easily expanded to accommodate different filters and
analyzers and then perform experiments using different combinations of filters and
analyzers to gather results.
The software I designed attempts to test several different CAPTCHA scripts with
a set of analysis techniques. Although it gathers data on the amount of both correct letters
and correct words, it does not have a means of gathering data on correct segmentation.

2.2 Mori and Malik
One of the more famous examples of defeating CAPTCHA is documented in the
19

paper Breaking a Visual CAPTCHA by Greg Mori and Jitendra Malik from the
University of California Berkeley and Simon Fraser University, respectively [22]. They
took on the challenge of breaking Gimpy and EZ-Gimpy, the Yahoo CAPTCHA systems.
Using shape recognition techniques, the one word EZ-Gimpy CAPTCHA could be
broken 92% of the time, while the more difficult two overlaid word Gimpy CAPTCHA
could still be broken 33% of the time.
The technique employed by Mori and Malik involves three very basic steps at its
highest level. First, each individual shape is identified and a list of possible letters
assigned to it. Second, a set is composed by linking every possible combination of the
letters. Third, the set is compared to a dictionary to find the actual word the image is
displaying [23]. This technique has obvious limits as the EZ-Gimpy system uses actual
dictionary words and not random letters. Although this makes the system easier for a
human to use, it also makes it significantly easier to automatically decipher.
My own research uses CAPTCHA scripts which generate random characters
instead of dictionary words. Because of this my engine does not attempt to try to match
potential choices with a dictionary; but attempts to analyze each image individually and
gathers data on the percentage of correct letters and correct challenges.

2.3 Hocevar
Sam Hocevar, a developer, has worked diligently on his project "PWNtcha"
which stands for "Pretend We're Not a Turing Computer but a Human Antagonist."
Hocevar has discovered poorly designed generation techniques in many of the common
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forms of CAPTCHA used in a variety of bulletin board and blogging software which
allows them to be easily deciphered [Figure 6] [24].

Figure 6 - Chart outlining several types of easily broken CAPTCHA

Hocevar claims that his program is more of a toolkit for image filtering and
manipulation than a general purpose decoder. He can not feed any CAPTCHA to it, but
must custom tailor it to the type of CAPTCHA presented to it. His website provides
examples of significantly harder CAPTCHAs that he still cannot break and is unsure if he
will ever be able to [Figure 7].
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Figure 7 - Chart outlining several types of hard CAPTCHA

Sam Hocevar originally published his results from the PWNtcha project in 2004,
however he offered no source code. Unlike the aforementioned studies, he also did not
publish detailed methodology on how he accomplished his results stating ethical reasons.
Because of this, as opposed to more traditional studies, Hocevar's results were not
reproducible. In 2008, he did release the source code to PWNtcha publicly, stating that
the algorithms he used were for outdated CAPTCHAs that were no longer in use.

2.4 Atwood
Jeff Atwood, writer for the blog Coding Horror, described how his blog uses a
"naïve CAPTCHA" meaning the CAPTCHA does not change. It uses the same challenge
presented continually, yet the author claimed he has received fewer than ten SPAM
messages and that the naïve approach was 99.9% effective against stopping SPAM [19].
Atwood's article isn't about naïve approaches specifically, but rather it explains why
CAPTCHA isn't broken. He claims that although a few CAPTCHA-defeating proof of
concepts have been published, many major websites such as Google, Yahoo and Hotmail
still use CAPTCHA.
Furthermore, Atwood makes the argument that, "The real secret to CAPTCHA is
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that it hits spammers where they are most vulnerable: in the pocketbook. The minute you
put up a computational barrier, the entire economic model of SPAM comes crashing
down [19]."
This argument works logically when examining the previously mentioned
research of Chellapilla and Simard [21], Mori and Malik [22] and Hocevar [24]. In all of
the mentioned examples where CAPTCHA was broken, the researchers had to design
algorithms for a specific CAPTCHA. In the case of RMG vs. Ticketmaster [17], a
situation can be seen where the financial benefits of breaking CAPTCHA outweigh the
research costs.
In the case of smaller websites, it is not economically feasible to research
algorithms for every possible CAPTCHA type. Rather it is easier to submit SPAM to
every form that can be found and hope that some of them post to the website. I've
experienced this on my personal website, http://sumdog.com, where I incorporated
CaptchaPHP into the guestbook over two years ago to combat rising levels of SPAM.
The amount SPAM I receive dropped from several messages a week to fewer than ten
SPAM posts over the entire course of its implementation.
The importance of Atwood's work in regards to my own research is to show that
SPAM can be prevented by using unsophisticated techniques. With Atwood's very simple
naïve CAPTCHA, he was able to successfully reduce the amount of SPAM posted on his
website. My research into both naïve and non-CAPTCHA based approaches show that
there isn't an effective way to measure or compare the effectiveness of such approaches
over regular CAPTCHA challenges. Still, this information is important to note as it is
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significant to the general field of SPAM prevention.

2.5 Conclusions
From studying existing ventures into breaking CAPTCHA, there has been a
considerable amount of research done on breaking CAPTCHA by independent
researchers, major universities and even major corporations. Although many groups will
publish results as well as complex methodology, few will post actual source code, most
likely for ethical reasons.
What are considered easy cases have been solved for a considerable amount of
time and require only simple image filtering in combination with shape recognition to
solve. Harder cases may require additional work with segmentation and machine
learning, yet some researchers have been able to get reasonable success rates even with
such cases. The hardest challenges are images that use varying colors, intersecting lines,
words layered upon words and various other techniques that make filtering the original
characters very difficult while still maintaining easy visibility for human readers.
Even with all these innovations in segmentation, filtering and recognition, none of
the aforementioned studies have a general case algorithm to work universally on all
CAPTCHAs. The methodology must be customized and tailored for each type; therefore,
attacks are most often targeted, either to specific types of challenges or to a single
particular website of high interest to an attacker.
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Chapter 3 – Research and Experiments
My research focuses on three distinct yet related problems. One is to attempt and
break existing distorted word based CAPTCHA using freely available tools, the second is
to create or improve a form of CAPTCHA and the third is to compare the effectiveness of
using CAPTCHA based alternatives. The first problem involves writing an application to
compare different approaches to breaking CAPTCHA. The second involves creating a
script to implement a new form of photo identification base CAPTCHA. The third
problem involves examining statistics from services which provider alternatives to
CAPTCHA.
In this chapter I describe the Java based BMCB engine I designed to generate data
sets of CAPTCHA images and run experiments against those sets using optical character
recognition applications. I also cover FlickMeCaptcha, a PHP add-in I designed to be
easy to integrate into existing websites that offers an improvement on photo-based
CAPTCHA. Finally, I examine Akismet, an alternative to CAPTCHA which examines
website submissions the same way e-mail filters examine messages for SPAM and
compare its effectiveness to CAPTCHA.

3.1 BMCB Engine
The BMCB engine generates several sets of CAPTCHA images with known
answers and stores those answers and their corresponding files in a database. The engine
can then be used to apply image filtering, segmentation (separating individual characters
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into sub images) and analysis techniques to the image sets and see how well the computer
functions in determining the text in the CAPTCHA images. The engine is dynamic
enough that it can be used for analyzing each image independently or using machine
learning to train an analyzer with one of the data sets.
All of the generators, filters, segmentators and analyzers that come with the
engine are based on existing open source technologies, however they can all easily be
expanded to incorporate various technologies and algorithms. Most of the default
analyzers are wrappers for open source Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software.
By itself, the OCR software would have difficulty interpreting the highly distorted
images, therefore the use of filtering and segmentation on the images was attempted to
see if they would improve the OCR software’s ability to correctly identify challenges.

3.1.1 Experiment Constraints
The engine is highly adaptable with the ability to set constraints within the
workflow classes. In the experiments detailed within this paper, several open source
CAPTCHA generators were modified to take in an argument from the command line in
order to create a set of known CAPTCHA challenge images and responses. The following
constraints were used:
•

The CAPTCHAs consist of a set of random letters distorted in the common image
based CAPTCHA

•

All CAPTCHAs in a given data set are all a fixed length of five characters

•

CAPTCHAs only contain letters, no numbers, with the challenge response being
case insensitive
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•

Each CAPTCHA set consists of 1000 challenge response images
The constraints may seem restrictive, however they allow the design of the engine

to focus on a very narrow scope and solve simple problems before progressing on to the
general case.

3.1.2 Set Generation
In order to generate a set of known CAPTCHA challenges, common open source
script need to be slightly modified. The engine has a default Command Line Generator
class that will take any program given to it, pass that program the CAPTCHA letters as
the first argument and the path to where the distorted image should be written as the
second. Most generation scripts can easily be modified by altering the methods used to
randomly generate the text within the image as well as the function used to display the
image on the webpage.
Four different CAPTCHA generation scripts were used with the engine. Three of
them are PHP based open source CAPTCHA tools: CaptchaPHP [25], Freecap [26] and
Gotcha [27]. The final script is a custom one that creates an undistorted image in an
easily readable font to be used for the trivial case to test the accuracy of the analyzers
[Figure 8].
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Figure 8 - Types of CAPTCHA

3.1.3 Image Filtering
The default filtering class that comes with the engine is a wrapper for the
command line file manipulation tool ImageMagick. ImageMagick is an open source tool
used to programmatically perform common image manipulation tasks such as brightness,
contrast, color adjustment, edge detection, resizing, transformation, etc.
Simple effects such as brightness and contrast adjustment can greatly affect the
readability of the image, both by humans and character recognition programs.
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ImageMagick uses the “modulate” parameter to adjust brightness and contrast [Figure 9 - Figure 10].

Figure 9 - Original CAPTCHA

Figure 10 - CAPTCHA with Modulate Filter 110,100 Applied

Noise reduction is another helpful filter when trying to examine images. The
noise reduction filter helps to remove much of the distortion from areas of heavy
changing contrast. Typically applied to photos to improve sharpness and remove
imperfections, noise reduction can greatly improve the ability of an analyzer to recognize
characters in a CAPTCHA [Figure 11 - Figure 12].

Figure 11 - Original CAPTCHA
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Figure 12 - Noise Reduction Filter Applied

Filters can be used either by themselves or in combination with each other in
order to remove noise from an image and make the image easier to process by shape
recognition algorithms.

3.1.4 Analysis
Two basic analyzers are included with the engine. The first is GOCR, an open
source OCR program released under the GNU General Public License, which was
originally developed by Joerg Schulenburg who now leads a team of independent
developers. The latest release of the software was in March of 2007 [28]. The second
analyzer is OCRAD, an open source OCR program developed as a GNU project by the
Free Software Foundation. Its latest release was in June of 2007 [29].
Both GOCR and OCRAD can be run directly from the command line. As their
first argument, they take in a Portable Anymap (PNM) File. Their output is ASCII text in
the standard western alphabet representing its recognition of the text [Figure 13].
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Figure 13 - OCRAD Analyzing a Trivial Image

The Guessing Analyzer is a trivial analyzer, which must know the length of the
CAPTCHA (i.e. it must be called using a method that provides an array of image
segments) and then randomly guesses the letters in the image without any analysis.
Combined with the equally trivial Even Length Segementator, the Guessing Analyzer can
be used to test the probability of correctly randomly guessing a CAPTCHA.

3.1.5 Experiments
The framework is designed so that experiments can be implemented in the form
of workflows. Experiment workflows can be as simple as just taking raw unfiltered
images and passing them directly to the analyzer or can be as complex as passing each
image through a series of filters, before or after being segmented and eventually
analyzed. The tools are chained together by utilizing a standard object for holding and
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manipulating the image.
The most basic experiments executed here include two control situations. One
uses the analyzers to examine the accuracy of standard text. For the case of this
experiment, the font used to render the unaltered text was COLLEGE.TTF. It was chosen
because, although all the characters are uniform, unique and have mostly straight edges,
the letters are somewhat non-standard and easily confusable with one another, allowing
the control set to test the analyzers in less than unique conditions.
The second control situation involves the analyzers examining CAPTCHA images
without first being filtered, segmented or altered in any way. The results of such a set
would show the capabilities of analysis by itself without the benefit of pre-filtering,
segmentation or any other noise reducing technique.
There is also a third, nondeterministic control test in which the analyzer randomly
attempts to guess the letters in the CAPTCHA challenge without performing any filtering
or analysis. It has the advantage of knowing the length of the CAPTCHA and shows the
results of randomly guessing for that one ideal case and shows the feasibility of using
such a brute force technique.
In addition to the control or trivial cases, there are several experiments which
filter the images before passing them to the analyzers. Filtering experiments include
changing various degrees of brightness and contrast as well as adding modulation. The
specific settings for each filter were chosen based on viewing the raw images in the
debugging tool and choosing the settings that did the best job of removing noise without
bleaching out the letters embedded within the image for each individual CAPTCHA type.
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The goal of the experiments is to easily break CAPTCHA. A high success rate is
not necessary as automated software can make thousands of requests an hour. A success
rate of 10% would be sufficient to post over 100 messages an hour, assuming over 1,000
requests could be made within an hour. Such a rate is more that feasible on a standard
consumer grade high speed internet connection.

3.1.6 Results
The first experiment results show [Figure 14; Table 1] that randomly guessing,
even on a small and known number of letters per image, proves to have a very low
success rate. Only individual letters are guessed correctly and never with more than a 4%
accuracy on a set size of 1,000. Randomly guessing solutions to CAPTCHA using this
brute force technique is simply not a viable solution.
In the second set of experiments, the analyzers are tested against the raw
CAPTCHA challenges without any filtering. GOCR by itself without any filtering does
not correctly identify any full challenges except in the trivial case and even then, it only
has a 68% success rate. In most cases, it can identify fewer that 1% of individual
characters correctly [Figure 15; Table 2].
OCRAD does better in the raw test for individual characters, but not as well as
GOCR for complete words. Counter-intuitive to the trivial results, OCRAD does do
substantially better with the distorted images and is able to solve a very small percentage
of challenges for both CaptchaPHP and Freecap [Figure 16; Table 3].
The third experiment involves adjusting the brightness of the CAPTCHA by a
factor of ten while keeping the contrast constant. Using GOCR, adjusting the brightness
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yielded a slight increase in word character for CaptchaPHP without increasing accuracy
in any other categories [Figure 17; Table 4].
OCRAD’s character analysis of CaptchaPHP and Freecap benefitted from a tenpoint increase in brightness, as well as its word analysis of Freecap increasing its full
word success rate to over 1% [Figure 18; Table 5].
The fourth experiment was similar to the third except the brightness was adjusted
to 180 while the contrast stayed constant. By adjusting the brightness, GOCR was able to
make significant gains in its analysis of CaptchaPHP’s challenge. Other CAPTCHAs did
did not see an increase in correctness with the combination of GOCR and the filter
[Figure 19; Table 6].
OCRAD also performed well against CaptchaPHP by adjusting the brightness to
180. It was also able to identify a very small percentage of characters in Gotcha as well as
increase its accuracy against the trivial case [Figure 20; Table 7].
The fourth experiment not only adjusted the brightness to 140, but also reduced
the contrast to 5. With the 140/5 filter, GOCR did better in its analysis of Freecap with a
word accuracy of 0.7%, but decreased its effectiveness of CaptchaPHP [Figure 21; Table
8].
OCRAD did better against CaptchaPHP in correct letters with the 140/5 filter than
GOCR gaining both a higher correct letter and word count, however, it was less effective
against Freecap [Figure 22; Table 9].
In the fifth experiment, once again, only the brightness was increased. With a
brightness adjustment of 160, this test places GOCR at the highest success rate of solving
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CaptchaPHP with a correct word accuracy of 0.5%. The effect of brightness adjustment
with CaptchaPHP seems to have the most significant effect on increasing its readability.
Other CAPTCHAs did not see any significant rates of solvability [Figure 23; Table 10].
Increasing the brightness to 160 did help improve OCRAD’s correct letters
success rate against CaptchaPHP giving it a letter accuracy of 31.0%, the highest
accuracy in individual letters out of any other experiment. However, other filters
provided higher accuracy in correct words [Figure 24; Table 11].
In the final experiment, noise reduction is used with a radius of 1 to filter the
images. GOCR did help with correctly identifying CaptchaPHP challenges, however the
rate of success was not as significant as other filters with only a 0.3% word accuracy for
CaptchaPHP and 0% for the other two non-trivial tests. [Figure 25; Table 12].
OCRAD preformed slightly better with noise reduction than GOCR in accuracy
of correct letters but did not do as well in correctly identifying words. As with GOCR,
noise reduction was not as effective as other techniques [Figure 26; Table 13].
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Figure 14 - Graph of Trivial Experiment Results from Guessing

Table 1 - Trivial Experiment Results from Guessing

Letters Correct
Words Correct

CaptchaPHP
4.3%
0

Gotcha
3.9%
0
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Freecap
3.5%
0

Trivial
3.9%
0

Figure 15 - Graph of Raw GOCR Test

Table 2 - Results from Raw GOCR Test

Letters Correct
Words Correct

CaptchaPHP
0.6%
0

Gotcha
<0.1%
0
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Freecap
1.3%
0

Trivial
86.6%
68.3%

Figure 16 - Graph of Raw OCRAD Test

Table 3 - Results from Raw OCRAD Test

Letters Correct
Words Correct

CaptchaPHP
3.3%
0.1%

Gotcha
<0.1%
0
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Freecap
7.5%
0.7%

Trivial
79.9%
31.5%

Figure 17 - Graph of GOCR Analysis of 110 Brightness Adjusted Image

Table 4 - Results from GOCR Analysis of 110 Brightness Adjusted Image

Letters Correct
Words Correct

CaptchaPHP
1.4%
0.1%

Gotcha
<0.0%
0%
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Freecap
0.9%
0%

Trivial
86.7%
68.6%

Figure 18 - Graph of OCRAD Analysis of 110 Brightness Adjusted Image

Table 5 - Results from OCRAD Analysis of 110 Brightness Adjusted Image

Letters Correct
Words Correct

CaptchaPHP
6.8%
0.0%

Gotcha
<0.0%
0%
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Freecap
35.6%
1.5%

Trivial
89.1%
56.0%

Figure 19 - Graph of GOCR Analysis of 180 Brightness Adjusted Image

Table 6 - Results from GOCR Analysis of 180 Brightness Adjusted Image

Letters Correct
Words Correct

CaptchaPHP
12.9%
0.4%

Gotcha
<0.1%
0
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Freecap
0%
0%

Trivial
79.6%
44.0%

Figure 20 - Graph of OCRAD Analysis of 180 Brightness Adjusted Image

Table 7 - Results From OCRAD Analysis of 180 Brightness Adjusted Image

Letters Correct
Words Correct

CaptchaPHP
30.8%
0.4%

Gotcha
0.8%
0%
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Freecap
7.5%
0.7%

Trivial
93.1%
71.5%

Figure 21 - Graph of GOCR Analysis of 140 Brightness, 5 Contrast Adjusted Image

Table 8 - Results From GOCR Analysis of 140 Brightness, 5 Contrast Adjusted Image

Letters Correct
Words Correct

CaptchaPHP
13.1%
0.0%

Gotcha
<0.0%
0%
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Freecap
1.0%
0.7%

Trivial
86.7%
68.6%

Figure 22 - Graph of OCRAD Analysis of 140 Brightness, 5 Contrast Adjusted Image

Table 9 - Results from OCRAD Analysis of 140 Brightness, 5 Contrast Adjusted Image

Letters Correct
Words Correct

CaptchaPHP
30.5%
0.4%

Gotcha
0.0%
0%
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Freecap
0.2%
0.0%

Trivial
89.5%
59.4%

Figure 23 - Graph of GOCR Analysis of 140 Brightness Adjusted Image

Table 10 - Results from GOCR Analysis of 140 Brightness Adjusted Image

Letters Correct
Words Correct

CaptchaPHP
13.7%
0.5%

Gotcha
<0.0%
0%
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Freecap
0.0%
0.0%

Trivial
86.4%
67.4%

Figure 24 - Graph of OCRAD Analysis of 160 Brightness Adjusted Image

Table 11 - Results from OCRAD Analysis of 160 Brightness Adjusted Image

Letters Correct
Words Correct

CaptchaPHP
31.0%
0.3%

Gotcha
0.3%
0%
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Freecap
0.0%
0.0%

Trivial
90.5%
62.1%

Figure 25 - Graph of GOCR Analysis of Noise Reduced Image

Table 12 - Results from GOCR Analysis of Noise Reduced Image

Letters Correct
Words Correct

CaptchaPHP
6.7%
0.3%

Gotcha
<0.0%
0%
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Freecap
1.5%
0.0%

Trivial
58.3%
19.7%

Figure 26 - Graph of OCRAD Analysis of Noise Reduced Image

Table 13 - Results from OCRAD Analysis of Noise Reduced Image

Letters Correct
Words Correct

CaptchaPHP
7.6%
0.1%

Gotcha
0.8%
0.0%
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Freecap
3.6%
0.0%

Trivial
32.8%
1.1%

3.2 FlickMeCaptcha
Part of the research not only deals with trying to break existing CAPTCHA, but
also to creating a new CAPTCHA. Previously, in section 1.4.3 Photograph Identification,
this paper had covered an existing type of visual CAPTCHA based on using photos
where several of the images contain kittens. To prove one is human, the user must select
all the images which contain kittens. The disadvantage to this technique is that a very
large selection of images is required for this type of CAPTCHA to work. It also offers no
alternative for visually impaired users.
The first disadvantage can be addressed by using publicly available images that
have been pre-categorized. Rather than trying to construct an image repository that is
static, the service Flickr from Yahoo offers a means by which regular people can upload
photos to share over the Internet and assign them metadata known as 'tags' indicating
information about the photos. Flickr offers a public application programming interface
(API) to search and interact with the photo repository. With new photos being uploaded
everyday and existing photos given new tags at the same rate, Flickr provides a very
broad and dynamic base of photos to use in photo-based CAPTCHA.
The application I developed as proof of concept is called FlickMeCaptcha. It is
written in PHP and uses Flickr's representative state transfer (REST) API in order to
perform searches for photos. It creates a CAPTCHA challenge that displays images in a
grid from which the user must pick out images which relate to a given tag. The amount of
images displayed is configurable within the application, but by default it displays nine
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images in a square grid. Four of the images match the given tag and at least three of them
must be selected for the challenge to be answered correctly [Figure 27].

Figure 27 - FlickMeCaptcha

FlickMeCaptcha can retrieve the tags it uses in two ways. The first way is to use a
predefined list stored in a text file with the application. The second is that it can retrieve
the most popular tags on Flickr and randomly select from the set of popular tags. Using a
text file has the distinct disadvantage of having a statically defined set of tags. Without a
sufficiently large list, it may be possible to circumvent the CAPTCHA simply by
examining all photos with a given tag. Popular tags may seem like an obviously better
choice, however there are many cases where popular tags have nothing to do with the
content of the photograph. For instance, one popular tag is "Cannon10kn" which referees
not to the photo itself, but to what camera was used to take it.
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3.3 Non-CAPTCHA based SPAM Defense
Several services have arisen to combat SPAM, not by using CAPTCHA to ensure
the poster is human, but by analyzing the content of the message in the same way e-mail
filters work. Many of these services are free to use for non-profits and individual.
Companies that provide the services pull in revenue to sustain themselves by offering
commercial licenses. In my research I've examined the following three services: Akismet
[13], Mollom [14] and Defensio [15].
Akismet is a service that analyzes blog and forum comments to determine if a
particular message is SPAM or a legitimate interactive post from a human (what its
designers refer to as "Ham"). Submissions to the service return a true or false indicating if
the post is SPAM. Many popular content management systems such as WordPress and
Drupal have plugins that run all user submitted content through Akismet's service.
According to Akismet's statistics page which is continually updated, as of
February 2009, Akismet has caught over 9.8 billion SPAM messages while allowing 1.8
billion Ham messages [30]. The service interface allows site maintainers to mark false
negatives and false positives, although quantities of such identifications do not appear on
the overall statistics page. The inner workings of Akismet are kept mostly secret in order
to prevent malicious users from "gaming the system [31]."
Criticism has been raised about Akismet flagging Ham comments as false
positives for SPAM. A blogger, that goes by the pseudonym "timetheif," posted the
following about Akismet in early 2008:
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"Although I have never experienced this problem before, as of yesterday
the comments that I leave on wordpress.com blogs where I have
previously been approved did not appear immediately after I posted them.
I became suspicious and did some investigation and found that the
comments are ending up in the Akismet spam filter. Thus far raincoaster,
sulz, thesacredpath and several other bloggers have found my comments
in the Akismet filter and fished them out [32]."

An alternative to Akismet is Mollom, which also has plugins for several major
content and blogging engines. As of February 2009, Mollom has claims to have caught
33.9 million SPAM messages with an average efficiency of 99.95%, meaning that only 5
in every 10,000 SPAM messages are not caught [33]. It is very similar to Akismet in the
sense that is it a web based service that is free for non-commercial use and sustains itself
with licensing for commercial and enterprise use.
Defensio is yet another direct competitor to Akismet and Mollom with a similar
suite of plugins for major content engines and a free for non-commercial use license. In
January of 2009, Defensio was acquired by Websense [34]. Unlike its competitors,
Defensio does not offer a statistics page on its website to show the amount of SPAM its
filter has blocked.
It is difficult to get accurate numbers for false-positives when it comes to
CAPTCHA SPAM protection since oftentimes a user with visual disabilities may have
several failed attempted before successfully being able to post a message or may give up
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in frustration altogether. Although there are more statistics gathered for non-CAPTCHA
based approaches, and such approaches have a more reliable way of determining falsepositives (i.e. humans marking incorrectly flagged messages), there still seems to be no
reasonable means by which to compare the two techniques.
The advantages of using a non-CAPTCHA based technique for preventing SPAM
include the ability for visually impaired individuals to easily post messages as well as
reducing the burden of the end users for proving that they are in fact human. The
drawback is the possibility of false-positives and the requirement of website
administrators to occasionally check responses marked as SPAM. This may become
impractical for sites with heavy amounts of traffic such as bulletin boards or websites
with significant amounts of comments. The advantages of either technique are not easily
measurable or comparable due to the difficulty in creating controlled SPAM
environments, difficulty in the collection of statistics on CAPTCHA based systems
without human interactive studies and the closed source nature of non-CAPTCHA based
alternatives.
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Chapter 4 – Analysis

4.1 Degree of Success for the BMCB Engine
Examining the BMCB Engine, the best-case results with optimized filters show
success rates ranging from 1 in 1000 to 3 in 1000. Although this may seem like a very
low rate of success, the requests to web servers are automated and most web servers are
designed to handle very large volumes of simultaneous connections. To determine if such
a success rate is adequate to post large amounts of SPAM, the connection and transfer
times must be examined as well.
Given that the average broadband connection within the United States is
approximately 1.9Mbps [35], a CAPTCHA the size of 1 to 5 kilobytes would take less
than a second to transfer at that speed, but the connection to the web server itself is
expensive. Although most web servers support pipelining, that is the ability to stream
multiple requests on a single connection, answering a CAPTCHA challenge requires a
request for the image followed by a response to the server, which must then terminate.
Connection times can vary greatly depending on the server being access and
network congestion. Assuming a modest average case connection time of two seconds, it
is reasonable to assume at worst it would take five seconds (two per request and one to
download the image itself) to request and respond to a website with a CAPTCHA
challenge.
This would mean 12 requests could be completed per minute or over 700 per
hour. With success rates using the engine at under 1 in 1000, this would mean at most,
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only one SPAM message could be posted per hour. If the assumption is given that there is
a very fast connection with minimal delay to a web server, and the entire
request/response process only took one second, over 3,000 requests could be handled per
hour allowing for the possibility of posting up to 3 messages an hour.
Since it's been established that the return rate for SPAM is very low, at best 1 in
1,000 and at worst 1 in 1,000,000 [19], a dedicated system in the best-case scenario of
one response per second would be required to run for over 10 days in order to get a single
return for SPAM posting efforts.
Although adding additional computers could increase the effectiveness of
breaking CAPTCHA, the cost would still be prohibitive. The research given here shows
that using open source and freely available image recognition and OCR analysis tools
does not yield a high enough rate of return to be useful in producing SPAM messages.
Furthermore, examining the results shows that specific sets of filters can yield
better results for one CAPTCHA while making results worse for another. For example,
CaptchaPHP had the greatest success rate of 0.5% resulting from GOCR analysis
combined with a 140 brightness adjustment. In the same experiment, Freecap had a
success rate of 0%. Freecap's highest success rate was 1.5% using OCRAD analysis with
a brightness adjustment of 110. In the same experiment CaptchaPHP had a success rate of
0%. This shows that filters and analysis must be specifically targeted to a given type of
CAPTCHA.
In the case of the Gotcha CAPTCHA, not a single experiment was able to get
even one challenge solved. Some experiments were able to correctly identify some letters
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with success rates in the range of less than 0.1% to 0.8%, however the trivial test which,
attempts to randomly guess the challenge without performing any type of analysis had a
higher character success rate of 3.9%. This shows that for this one CAPTCHA, randomly
guessing the challenge's answer has a higher rate of success than actually trying to
analyze the image. Researchers have shown particular CAPTCHAs may be solvable, but
to do so would require specific and directed effort into analysis of that particular
CAPTCHA. There is, as of yet, no general algorithm that is effective against all
challenges. Therefore small and moderately sized websites, blogs and message boards are
reasonably protected from SPAM with CAPTCHA. Only large sites, where the potential
for financial gain to outweigh the substantial research and development cost in breaking
CAPTCHA, need to be concerned with such attacks.

4.2 Pros and Cons of FlickMeCaptcha
FlickMeCaptcha is an improvement over existing implementations of image
based CAPTCHA such as KittenAuth. There are several advantages including the
following:
•

Availability of large selection of constantly growing images for challenges

•

Ability to select random tags from the most popular set on Flickr

•

Many configurable options including number of images to display and
number of correct images that must be selected

•

Ability to use a predefined wordlist

Although FlickMeCaptcha does solve some problems with photo-based
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CAPTCHA, the largest concern being the base of images from which to chose from, it
does bring up some new problems of its own. They include the following:
•

Most popular tags on Flickr often do not represent anything in the image
(e.g. a tag indicating the camera model used to take the photo)

•

Copyright constraints restrict the available images to those licensed under
the creative commons

•

The current implementation makes several successive calls to the REST
service instead of utilizing HTTP pipelines, causing a performance delay

Overall, the gains in photo-based CAPTCHA are significant and the script is more
of a proof of concept that can be expanded upon and easily integrated into content
management software and blogging engines.

4.3 Filtering versus CAPTCHA
Studying the alternatives to CAPTCHA resulted in finding a number of web
service based filters with open programming implementations than can be used by many
different types of content management software. Although many of the implementations
provided general and overall statistics, none of them provided more detailed numbers that
could be filtered or used to drill-down specifics. Due to this, studying the effectiveness of
these approaches versus CAPTCHA becomes difficult. Akismet staff has even stated
publicly that such studies would be ineffective [36].
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Chapter 5 – Contributions to the Field
The crux of the research presented in this thesis comes from two programs
specifically written for expanding knowledge of the field of CAPTCHA and SPAM
prevention. Both programs are released as open source and will continue to be available
for developers and researchers to expand upon. The first program is the BMCB Engine
whose audience is specifically developers and researchers who want to test techniques for
attaching and breaking CAPTCHAs. The second program is FlickMeCaptcha, a program
intended for web developers and end users to provide a new image based CAPTCHA that
can not easily be solved.

5.1 BMCB Engine
Although the BMCB Engine did not meet the measure of success proposed, that is
the ability to solve CAPTCHA at a success rate necessary to post large amounts of
SPAM in a reasonable amount of time using freely available filtering and analysis
programs, it did provide some insights and contributions to others attempting the same
type of research.
The results show that it is possible to use image filtering in combination with
existing OCR tools to solve current CAPTCHAs automatically without the need of a
human and in effect defeating the purpose of the test. However, since the percentages for
success are so low, website administrators could protect themselves simply by installing
software or hardware that tracks repetitive and continual network requests. Such software
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is often used to prevent Denial of Service attacks. If such a system were in place, an
attacker would need to use some type of distributed network or a set of computers
compromised with a virus to effectively carry out an attack.
Furthermore, the attack must be targeted towards specific types of CAPTCHA. In
the existing studies published, the algorithms used were specific websites and CAPTCHA
scripts. The engine, along with results from existing research, show that filtering works
best when it is target to a specific image challenge. There has been no evidence to show
that it would be easy, nor is it currently possible, to generate an all-purpose analyzer that
would be capable of decoding all types of CAPTCHA as well as a human could.
The analyzers and filters that come with the engine I developed are very basic and
rely on existing, publicly available and free open source tools, yet still yield viable
results. The advantage of using existing tools is that the engine itself is designed to be
easily extendable, dynamic and can be adapted to facilitate other research with more
complex algorithms. In its current state, it can be released to the public without large
ethical concerns. It is my hope that this contribution to the open source community will
help further future innovations and will be a useful tool for others who are interested in
the field.

5.2 FlickMeCaptcha
FlickMeCaptcha provides a new tool that can be implemented by website
designers to provide a new type of CAPTCHA to end-users. Although it uses the concept
of photo-based challenges, which have been implemented before, the means by which it
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acquires photos is innovative and provides a much larger and constantly changing base
than previous implementations.
The are several advantages for using FlickMeCaptcha including a very large,
constantly changing base of images that can be displayed in different sizes and are fairly
easy to identify. The interface is fully customizable with Cascading Style Sheets (CSS)
and the project is open source, so it is free to modify, and the tags used are stored in a
plain text file that can easily be modified.
There are also disadvantages of using FlickMeCaptcha. The option to use popular
tags instead of a list is not very useful due to many tags not relating to the photos directly.
There is also the possibility that individuals have given photos tags that don’t necessarily
relate to them in an intuitive way, meaning the user may have to attempt to solve the
CAPTCHA several times before being given a relevant set of images. FlickMeCaptcha is
also limited to photos on Flickr that are copyright free, limiting the potential base of
images. This can be changed in the setup but may cause legal problems. Finally, there is
no built-in alternative for the visually impaired, so FlickMeCaptcha would have to be
paired with another approach to be inclusive to those with disabilities.

5.3 Conclusion
Analyzing the problem of SPAM and the solution on CAPTCHA does not address
the core problem that allows SPAM to propagate and be as invasive as it is. The core
problem with SPAM is its success rate. Even with only a return of fifty responses to
every million SPAM messages sent [37], the model is still economically viable because
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the messages themselves cost virtually nothing to send. The cost to bandwidth, computer
security and the massive infrastructure that must be put in place to deal with SPAM is
detrimental to growth on the Internet.
Although CAPTCHA has been and will continue to be a viable solution, with new
and innovative forms of CAPTCHA improving human success rates while being
increasingly effective against automated attacks, the main problem is that SPAM will
continue as long as there is a consumer response, no matter how minuscule. In order to
remove the need for CAPTCHA and other SPAM prevention techniques, Internet users
need to be more informed about identifying SPAM so as to not purchase products, and
thereby grant legitimacy, to websites that use SPAM based promotions, to the degree that
the return rate of SPAM becomes financially unviable.
Individuals have been running mass advertisements and scams using regular
postal mail for decades before the age of the Internet. The greater problem of increasing
awareness and social intelligence is well beyond the scope of this thesis. However, in the
meantime, the innovations that have come about through combating unsolicited e-mail,
viruses and malicious website attacks have been invaluable. Security research in both the
fields of prevention and circumvention have led to powerful innovations in machine
learning that have been of great benefit to the Computer Science community.

5.4 Future Work
Several areas of research exist which can be built on top of the results outlined in
this thesis. These areas of research include enhancing the existing analysis engine,
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expanding FlickMeCaptcha, and performing research on humans’ ability to correctly
respond to CAPTCHA challenges versus that of a machine.
The engine is licensed under the GNU General Public License (GNU GPL)
version 3, making it freely available for others to view, modify, enhance, learn from and
redistribute. Although the engine itself is structured to be a comprehensive testing
platform, the filters and analyzers themselves are not very strong. Since the engine is
written in Java and has several extendable abstract base classes, it can easily be expanded
to use new analysis algorithms and filtration techniques. Full guides for installing the
engine and developing with it are located in Appendix A and Appendix B respectively.
Along with studying existing CAPTCHAs, additional research is also warranted
in creating new CAPTCHA challenge techniques. FlickMeCaptcha is a wonderful proof
of concept, but it still has room for development. Features that could be developed for it
include an alternative CAPTCHA, either audio or word puzzle, for the visually impaired,
using pipelined connections to speed up response time (versus making multiple
connections to Flickr’s REST service) and a better means for choosing relevant tags.
Since no human studies were conducted for this thesis, another area of research
would involve human interaction with CAPTCHA and examine people’s success rate in
answering CAPTCHA challenges correctly in correlation to their age demographics and
visual impairments. Such research, in conjunction with computer analysis, could show
which techniques work better for humans and against automated programs.
The research in this thesis is one stepping stone in the complex fields of image
filtering and analysis. My hope is that the research presented in this thesis will help other
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researchers continue to examine and enhance CAPTCHA challenges and improve
security and protection against SPAM.
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Formatting Conventions
Filenames and paths to specific files will be listed in italics:
/usr/bin/vi
Commands that are intended to be typed in verbatim are represented in mono-type:
mysql
CREATE TABLE Bmcb;

Variables or options in commands will be specified using mono-type combined with
brackets and underlines:
./runCommand.sh [dryRun | fullTest ]

Class names that are traditionally camel cased in code are separated out into individual
words with each leading character capitalized and kept in the standard font:
Image Magick Filter Test Workflow.
Code inline with the paragraphs will be displayed in monotype with function names
ended with parenthesizes.
myFunction()
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Appendix A – Installing the Engine
The core of the engine is written in Java and it accesses several external programs
to perform tasks. Although many of the external programs are portable and the
application should be able to run on any system, it was primarily developed and tested on
a Linux system. The requirements listed below are for the configuration I used during
testing. BMCB may work with older or newer versions of the tools listed and customized
versions may not require all the tools listed for filtering and analysis.

Requirements and Dependencies
•

Java 1.5 or higher runtime environment and compiler

•

PHP for CAPTCHA generation (any recent build of PHP 4 or 5 with gd support
should work)

•

MySQL 5.0.26 or higher

•

ImageMagick 6.4 or higher

•

Apache Ant 1.7.0 or higher

Downloading the Source Files
The latest version of the BMCB engine, as well as this installation document, can
be found at http://penguindreams.org/page/see/Bmcb
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Unpacking the Source Files
After downloading and saving the compressed source file, open a terminal and
change to the directory it was saved to. Then run the tar command with appropriate
parameters to extract the archive, replacing <version> with the appropriate version of the
application.
tar xvfj Bmcb-<version>.tar.bz2

Compiling the Engine
An ant build file is included to easily compile the engine into a single jar file. To
start the compilation, run the ant application in the currently working directory where the
source code was extracted.
ant jar

Setting up the Database
An instance of MySQL must be running either on the system the engine is
installed onto or on a remote server. For the purposes of this installation, it is assumed the
engine and MySQL server are on the same computer.
A database must be created for the engine, permissions must be assigned to the
database and the schema for the engine must be imported. This can all be done from the
MySQL command line utility which can be run by simply running mysql from the
command prompt. If a root password has been defined, you may have to run mysql -u
root -p

and then enter your password when prompted. From the prompt, run the create
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and grant statements necessary to establish the database and issue permissions on it.
CREATE DATABASE bmcb;
GRANT ALL ON bmcb.* TO 'bmcb'@'localhost' IDENTIFIED BY 'bmcbdb';

The Configuration Files
Logging is provided using the Log4j libraries. The engine tries to locate the
log4j.property file in the current working directory. The default configuration should be
adequate for most users. To further tune the logging, documentation for log4j can be
found at http://logging.apache.org/log4j/1.2/.
Program specific configuration settings are found in the bmcb.config file located
in the programs current working directory. It contains path names, database attributes and
various other runtime configuration options needed for the engine. It will need to be
adjusted for the particular environment on which it is installed.
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Attribute

Description

db_host

Hostname of Database Server

db_user

Database Username

db_password

Database Password

db_database

Name of Database to use

db_port

Database port

cp_generators

Directory containing CAPTCHA generators

cp_setdirs

Directory to write dataset images

cp_tmpdirs

Directory to store temporary data

cp_results

Directory to store result graphs

cp_imagemagick

Full path to directory containing
ImageMagick executables

an_ocrad

Full path to OCRAD executable

an_gocr

Full path to GOCR executable

Running the Program
The application can be run directly from the jar file so long as it is run from the
directory which contains the /lib directory. If the application jar needs to be relocated
outside of the distribution directory, the manifest.txt must be modified to contain the path
to the external libraries located in /lib and the application must be recompiled. To run the
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engine, execute the jar file.
java -java Bmcb.jar

Running the jar will produce a usage statement.
Usage: Bmcb [generate|trivialTest|magickTest|SegmentDebug]

By default, BMCB can run several of the built-in workflows included with the
application. They include a generation workflow for creating CAPTCHA datasets and
two testing workflows for analyzing CAPTCHA and generating results. Using the
SegmentDebug option will start the graphical debugging tool displaying generated
datasets.
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Appendix B – High Level Overview of the Engine
Looking at the engine from the top down, all the tasks that are performed are in
the form of workflows. Workflows can be used to generate sets of CAPTCHAs to test
against or perform testing and analysis and gather statistics. A workflow is just a simple
Java class that is used to call all the other components of the framework. They can be
highly customizable to perform any type of experiment and have full access to all the
other public components in the framework.
Components accessible from the workflows include a variety of tools for
experiments including CAPTCHA generators, image filters, segmentators and analyzers.
Storage of generated datasets can be handled using the database classes and a variety of
static utility functions exist for the purpose of loading images, converting image types,
logging and generating result graphs [Figure 28].
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Figure 28 - High Level Overview of BMCB Engine

Generators
The Abstract Generator class provides the basis for any type of generator. The
primary included generator is the Command Line Generator, which calls an external
program with two arguments, the first being the text to be placed in the image and the
second being the directory to write the image to. The Abstract Generator can also be
extended for other purposes such as generation via an HTTP request, in the case where
the CAPTCHA is generated on a non-UNIX machine such as from an active server page
(ASP), or a Java based generator which uses existing Java classes to generate a
CAPTCHA.
CAPTCHA programs typically generate their challenge image text randomly.
77

Within the engine the text to be generated needs to be controlled in order to determine if
the analysis of the text is correct. The generated text is still random, but the correct
response needs to be stored in a database for comparison. Because of this, CAPTCHA
generators need to be modified slightly in order to work correctly with the generator
classes. For this reason, it is best to use open source CAPTCHA programs which can
easily be modified and adapted to work with the engine.

Segmentators
Segmentators are based off the Abstract Segmentator class. They are given the
argument of an image and are expected to return either a series of axes where a break
between letters would occur or an array of image objects that have been pre-segmented.
A given segmentation algorithm will extend this class and implement all the abstract
methods.

Filters
All filters are based on the Abstract Filter class. A filter is a preprocessor for an
image before it is used with a segmentator or analyzer. It takes in an image object and
applies some algorithm to the image to attempt to clean up general noise and distortion.
The filter is applied directly on the image passed into this object, so if an original copy is
needed for any purpose, it should be made before the filter is applied.

Analyzers
Analyzers are based off the Abstract Analyzer class. They perform the core of the
analysis process and can act upon either an entire image or an array of image segments.
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Abstract functions are also defined for learning and training the analyzer if a learning
style algorithm is used. Implementations of this class can chose to throw an Analysis Not
Supported Exception in cases where a particular algorithm may not have the ability to
learn or to accept image segments.

Workflows
Workflows are based on the Abstract Workflow class. They have an execution
method and are used to knit together all the steps and individual pieces necessary to
perform a task. For example, the Generator Workflow is executed to look through every
available CAPTCHA generator and create datasets for testing. Workflows can be used to
run a particular set of tasks for an experiment using a given set of images, segmentators,
filters and analyzers, as well as calculate the results.

Utility Classes
Several utility classes also exist to help deal with miscellaneous tasks required
through the course of the program. They include common application classes such as
those needed for reading configuration files and application logging as well as more
program specific classes for loading and storing images in various formats and rendering
charts and graphs from result sets.
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Appendix C – Developing with the Engine
The BMCB Engine is comprised of several components including the Generators,
Segmentators, Image Filters, Analyzers and Utilities. All these components are called
within a Workflow. New workflows must be added to the entry point of the program.
This guide is intended for developers who want to modify the engine for their own
analysis techniques and build new experiments into the engine.
This document follows a bottom up approach focusing on the individual
components and building them into a full experiment or workflow. Many useful
examples are included with the engine itself and should be read alongside this document
to gain a full understanding of how to build new experiments into the existing
framework.

Utility Classes
There are several independent utility classes contained within the framework that
are used throughout the application. Many of these classes contain static standalone
methods for basic tasks such as image conversion, logging, configuration, result graphing
and various other common tasks [Figure 29 - Diagram of Utility Classes].
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Figure 29 - Diagram of Utility Classes

Some of the more important utilities are as follows:
•

Application Logger: This class is called from many of the abstract classes in the
framework to initialize a protected log variable. Developers shouldn’t need to call
this directly unless they create a new class from scratch, as the existing log
variable is accessible in nearly every abstract class. Examples for creating new
instances are located in the abstract classes.

•

Image Loader: This class contains several functions to assist with image
manipulation including image loading, converting between Images and Buffered
Images, determining the path of an image from a dataset, converting images to
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PNM files used by OCR programs, and drawing lines on segment boundaries on
images to be used with the Segment Viewer debugging tool.
•

Process Executor: A simple class to handle the basic task of running an external
process

•

Config Map: Used to read settings from the bmcb.property file

Generators
The engine comes with a command line generation class which passes two
arguments to a command line application, the first being the CAPTCHA to be produced
and the second being the location for the output file. This process can be seen in the builtin generation workflow where random challenge/responses are generated, stored in a
database and then generated for each CAPTCHA type.
Typically, a CAPTCHA application generates its challenge randomly and does
not accept a challenge as an argument. Therefore, the CAPTCHA script needs to be
modified. For the purposes of using this engine, it is best to use open source CAPTCHAs
which can easily be modified. The following changes may be necessary before using a
CAPTCHA script with this engine:
•

Modify the program to take in the CAPTCHA phrase as the first argument

•

Write the output to a file given by the second argument

•

Adjust the front path to be independent from the script’s location
The following examples detail how these three modifications can be performed in

a typical PHP based CAPTCHA script. Each CAPTCHA script a developer wants to
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incorporate will require different modifications to be compatible with the built in
Command Line Generator, or it may require a custom generator.
Modifying the CAPTCHA application to take the input from a command line,
rather than generating it randomly, can be done in several ways. The developer can
modify the function that generates the random CAPTCHA or the point at which the key
is saved to the session can be modified [Figure 30].

Figure 30 - Modification to Gotcha to Take Challenge Input

Most CAPTCHA scripts have a function used to generate a random phrase or set
of letters. This section is what must be modified in order to use the script with the engine.
The type of modification will vary depending on the programming language used and
may require the creation of a customized generation class.
Typically, most CAPTCHA scripts are designed to output directly to a web
browser. This behavior must also be modified to write the file, with the challenge
solution as the filename, to a directory [Figure 31]. As with the previous modification,
this will vary heavily depending on the programming language of the script and the script
itself.
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Figure 31 - Modification of Freecap to Output Challenge to a File

Another modification that may or may not be necessary involves modifying the
path for included and dependent files. For many of the scripts included with the engine,
this involves modifying the statement that declared which font to use to be working
directory independent [Figure 32].

Figure 32 - Modification of Gotcha for Font Path
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The above modification may or may not be necessary depending on the way the
script loads its fonts and dependencies.
The above modifications are only some of the changes that may need to be made
to a CAPTCHA application in order to get it to work with the engine. Developers may
run into other challenges, however most CAPTCHA should be adaptable, either by
extending the Abstract Command Line Generator or by creating a custom generator class,
so long as the CAPTCHA application provides some means for manually inputting the
challenge response.

Image Filters
Image Filters extend the Abstract Filter class. They must modify a Buffered
Image that is passed to the filter by reference. If the calling class requires an unaltered
version of the Buffered Image, it must clone a copy before passing it to the filter.

Figure 33 - Class Diagram for Filters
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In addition, if a new Buffered Image is created during the filtering process, it can
be copied into the passed in argument. An example is the function for edge filtering
which returns a new Buffered Image object[Figure 34].

Figure 34 - Copying One Buffered Image to Another

Segmentators
Segmentators are based on the Abstract Segmentator class. An instance of all the
segmentator objects is created specifically for an image. Derived classes must implement
the abstract getSegmentAxes() function which returns the x coordinate where the
image is split into separate vertical segments. Various other functions in the base class
can be called to split the image into individual arrays of Buffered Image objects to be
used within the workflows [Figure 35].
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Figure 35 - Class Diagram for Segmentators

Analyzers
Analyzers are what actually try to solve the CAPTCHA challenge after
appropriate filters and segmentation have been applied. The Abstract Analyzer has been
designed to contain several functions in the case of learning and non-learning algorithms
as well as different functions for analyzing segments as opposed to full images.
Analyzers which do not support a given abstract function can choose to throw an
Analysis Not Supported Exception. An abstract Command Line Analyzer has been
included to assist in the process of calling an external application for analysis [Figure 36].
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Figure 36 - Class Diagram for Analyzers

Workflows
The piece that ties all the individual components together is the workflow. The
workflow calls all the individual pieces listed so far and can be used for generation of set
data, analysis or any various other tasks. The workflows included with the engine are
used for data generation, analysis and testing. Developers will want to either modify
existing workflows or create new workflows for whatever experiments they may wish to
perform [Figure 37].
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Figure 37 - Class Diagram for Workflows

The Abstract Workflow class contains a protected runSpecifc() function
which takes in all the individual components including a Segmentator, Filter and
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Analyzer, along with a description for results and logging purposes, and runs them
against all the currently available datasets.

Entry Point
The BMCBMain class provides the primary entry point for the application. After
creating additional workflows, an appropriate command line argument or set of command
line arguments will be need to be added to the main function to kick off the workflow.

Visual Debugging Tools
There is also a Segment Viewer packaged with the engine. It is a graphical tool to
view data sets as well as the results from segmentators, image filters and analyzers
[Figure 38]. Newly created Segmentators, Analyzers and Image Filters can easily be
added to the Segment Viewer.

Figure 38 - Visual Debugger
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Appendix D – FlickMeCaptcha

Installation
The most current version of FlickMeCaptcha can be found at
http://penguindreams.org/projects/flickmecaptcha in the download section. Simply
download the appropriate tar file and extract it to a working directory.
tar xvfj flickmecaptcha-<version>.tar.gz

The compressed tar file contains FlickMeCaptcha.php which is the primary script
and only one necessary to integrate the application into an existing website. There is also
a script named example.php which shows how to integrate the application into a form and
provides a means for testing the application on a web server.
There are several configuration options,, which can be set in the
FlickMeCaptcha.php file. Most of these options can be left at their default. The only
setting which must be changed is the scriptFile variable which must point to the
web path where the script is located. Other variables purposes and settings are
documented within the script file itself.

Integration
To present the CAPTCHA within a web form, the FlickMeCaptcha.php script
must be included in the current PHP file followed by a call to the getChallenge()
function [Figure 39]. Please note that the session must be started using the
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session_start() function in PHP before creating or verifying the CAPTCHA.

Figure 39 - Adding FlickMeCaptcha to a Form

Once the form has been submitted, the CAPTCHA can be verified for correctness
using the checkChallenge() function [Figure 40].

Figure 40 - Verifying FlickMeCaptcha Challenge
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